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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (1996) as this is an appeal from an order entered in a domestic 
relations case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE FINDING 
PF/L ITIONER DID NOT COHABIT THEREBY TERMINAL 1NG THE AWARD OF ALIMONY; 
SECOND ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING 
RESPONDEN r IN CONT EMPT OF TI IE DECREE or DIVORCE; 
THIRD ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
A JUDGMENT FOR UNPAID ALIMONY; AND 
FOURTH ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: All lour issues are governed by the same standard of 
review. The Court's factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Petersen v. Petersen, 81 8 P.2d 1305. 1307 (I Itah Ct. App. 1991): llmkley v. Hinkier. 81 5 
P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court will not disturb the trial court's 
decision on modification absent an abuse of discretion. Hagen v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478, 
481 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES BELOW 
1. The first issue was preserved below at trial, where counsel for 
Appellant/Respondent (hcreinafter^Mr. Belleridge") argued that Appellee/Petitioner's 
(hereinafter twMs. Betteridge") alimony should be terminated based upon her admission 
that she was living with another man and the circumstantial evidence of sexual conduct. 
Tr. 270:1-10. |Note: both volumes of the Hearings, of February 19 and 28, 2004 R. 
669-670, will be hereinafter referred to as "Tr." followed by the page number and 
line of the transcript.]; 
2. The second issue was preserved below at trial, where (1) Mr. Betteridge\s 
counsel argued that Ms. Betteridge\s cohabitation should have terminated Mr. 
Bcttcridge's alimony obligation retroactive to the date of cohabitation, thereby cancelling 
Mr. Betteridge's obligation, thus his refusal to pa}' alimony was not contemptuous of the 
Court's order. Tr. 295:1 8-296:5; Addendum Brief. R. 413-415. 
3. The third issue was preserved below at trial, where Mr. Betteridge\s counsel 
argued that Mr. Betteridge should not be obligated to pay alimony in light of Ms. 
Betteridge\s cohabitation and it follows no judgment should enter for any arrears. Tr. 
295:18-296:5. 
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4. The fourth issue was preserved below at trial, where Ms. Bcttcridge\s 
counsel argued that Ms. Betteridge was entitled to costs and attorney fees based upon her 
defense of the cohabitation issue. Tr. 296:4-5. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Following the entry of the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Betteridge had another 
man, Mr. Jonnathen Reinen (hereinafter "Mr. Reinen"), living in her apartment. Tr. 
8:4-12. 2. Ms. Betteridge admitted Mr. Reinen spent the night in her 
apartment from October, 2002 to mid-January, 2003. 'I r. 8:1 7-20; 9:1 -2. Mr. Reinen 
admitted he spent the night in Ms. Betteridge\s apartment. I r. 87:10-16. 
3. Ms. Betteridge testified Mr. Reinen was a tenant and paid rent. IT. 9:12: 
235:7-236-15. Ms. Betteridge testified she needed a tenant because she needed the 
money. Tr. 8:4-12. 
4. Ms. Betteridge testified Mr. Reinen was not given a key to the apartment. 
Tr. 9:18-19. She testified she did not want him in her apartment when she was not at 
home. Tr. 13:18-21; 251:4-l 1; 252:2-10. 
5. Mr. Reinen testified Ms. Betteridge left a key under the mat so he could 
access the apartment when Ms. Betteridge was not at home. 1 r. 88:16-22. 
6. Mr. Reinen testified he had another apartment in the same apartment 
complex where numerous of his family members were living. Tr. 99:10-25. 
7. Mr. Reinen testified he spent time at his apartment in addition to Ms. 
Betteridge's. Tr. 102:3-4. 
8. Mr. Reinen testified he did not receive mail at Ms. Betteridge\s apartment, 
Tr. 101:18-19; he did not pay the utilities at Ms. Betteridge\s apartment Tr. 101:20-21; 
he paid her $200.00 per month in rent,, Tr. 87:19-22; and he did his laundry at Ms. 
Betteridge's apartment, Tr. 101:24-102:2. 
9. Ms. Betteridge admitted kissing Mr. Reinen on the mouth, Tr. 14:5-10; 
admitted hugging Mr. Reinen, Tr. 14:21-23; admitted she and Mr. Reinen held hands, 
Tr. 14:17-18; admitted she and Mr. Reinen went out to dinners, Tr. 10:22-11:16; 
movies, Tr. 1 1:17-22; and other activities, Tr. 1 1:23-25; 13:6-12. 
10. Ms. Betteridge denied having sexual relations with Mr. Reinen. Tr. 14:24-
25 and Mr. Reinen denied a sexual relationship with Ms. Betteridge. Tr. 94:6-7. 
11. Mr. Reinen testified he kept clothing at Ms. Betteridge\s apartment. Tr. 
9:23-24. Mr. Reinen testified he kept his toiletries at her apartment. Tr. 107:1 -8. 
12. Ms. Betteridge introduced Mr. Reinen to her immediate family. Tr. 12:6-
13:5. Ms. Betteridge had a Christmas party at her apartment on December 23, 2003. Tr. 
13:4-5. Ms. Betteridge's son, Shawn; son Brent and his wife, Michelle and her parents 
attended the party. Tr. 93:1-4. No friends were present. Mr. Reinen came to the party 
for an hour-and-a-half. Tr. 68:20-22. He changed clothes at Ms. Betteridge's apartment. 
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Tr. 70:17-20; 80:24-81:1. Mr. Reinen modeled the robe he said Ms. Betleridge had 
given him. Tr. 70:11-16; 106:6-10. 
13. On Christmas Day, 2002, Mr. Reinen attended Ms. Betteridge\s family 
party. Tr. 1 89:16-190:2. Only family members other than Mr. Reinen attended the 
party. Tr. 71:1 1-17; 79:21-23; 92:6-16. 
14. Ms. Betteridge gave Mr. Reinen a robe, slippers, and a leather eoat as a 
gifts. Tr. 10:2-7. 
15. Mr. Reinen gave Ms. Betteridge a birth stone ring, Tr. 10:10-13. and a 
pendant. Tr. 18:18-22. 
16. Ms. Betteridgc's parents gave Mr. Reinen a Christmas gift. I r. 194:5-13. 
They did not give any of Ms. Betteridge \s friends gifts. Tr. 195:19-22. 
17. Ms. Betteridge gave Mr. Reinen\s sister a gift. Tr. 256:14-17. Mr. 
Reinen\s mother gave Ms. Betteridge a Christmas gift. Tr. 256:8-11. 
18. Mr. Reinen attended Ms. Betteridge\s nieee\s birthday party where 
extended family members were present, but no other friends. Tr. 91:24-92:5. 
19. Ms. Betteridge denied she displayed a photograph of Mr. Reinen in her 
apartment. Tr. 15:16-16:1. 
20. Ms. Betteridge\s two sons testified there was a "book" type frame with Mr. 
Reinen \s photograph in one side and Ms. Betteridge\s photograph in the other side in Ms. 
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Betteridge\s living room. Tr. 72:10-24: 83:5-10. Her son. Shawn testified the only other 
photographs displayed were of family members, lr. 77:10-78:6. 
21. The Betteridge son testified Mr. Reinen sat at the Christmas party with his 
arm around Ms. Betteridge. Tr. 69:9-13; Shawn testified Mr. Reinen brought her food 
and drinks. Tr. 72:4-7. Both sons saw Ms. Betterdige and Mr. Reinen kiss. Tr. 69:1-3; 
69:1 8-70:2; 82:21-25. Shawn testified it was not his mother's normal behavior. Tr. 
69:13-17. 
22. Ms. Betteridge testified Mr. Reinen moved out because his family 
members moved from his apartment. Tr. 9:4-10. 
23. Mr. Reinen testified he primarily moved fiomMs. Bctteridgc's apartment 
because of the litigation involving the termination of alimony. Tr. 88:5-1 1. 
24. Ms. Betteridge\s counsel admitted that his client had testified at the 
original divorce trial she had engaged in an extramarital affair. IT. 272:10-13. 
25. The Court found Mr. Reinen was only in Ms. Betteridge\s apartment 
temporarily, Tr. 297:23-298:3; that Mr. Reinen did not have a key, Tr. 298:4-6; that Mr. 
Reinen was at the apcirtment without Ms. Betteridge on rare occasions, Tr. 298:6-7; they 
did not eat most meals together, Tr. 298:19-23 and there was no financial commingling, 
Tr. 298:24-299:3. 
26. The court found no sexual or conjugal relationship. 299:4-300:3. 
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27. The court held Mr. Betteridge in contempt and based upon Ms. Betteridge 
prevailing on the cohabitation issue, awarded costs and fees. Tr. 300:4-301:1. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) (Supp. 2003) states: 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
Ms. Betteridge filed an amended petition for divorce on June 8. 2001 in the third 
Judicial District Court for the State of Utah. Mr. Betteridge duly answered the petition. 
Trial was held on September 27, 2002. Ms. Betteridge\s counsel prepared proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Mr. Betteridge's 
counsel objected to the proposed Findings and Decree by way of Objection to the Form of 
the Proposed Findings and Decree and Request for Augmentation. Mr. Betteridge 
requested additional findings regarding the reasonable monthly expenses of the parties, 
the gross and net monthly income of Mr. Betteridge. Ms. Betteridge's counsel partially 
revised the Findings and Decree to address some of the issues. Mr. Bctteridge's counsel 
continued to object to the final documents and again requested augmentation of the 
findings by the Court regarding the income issue. Ms. Betteridge responded to the 
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Objection and a hearing was held on the Objection on December 23. 2002. After 
argument, the Court denied the request to augment the findings to include an income for 
Mr. Betteridge upon which his ability to pay alimony was based. The Court interlineated 
the findings and decree and entered them on that date. Mr. Betteridge appealed the 
Decree, arguing, among other things, that the findings were insufficient to support the 
orders in the Decree. Mr. Betteridge\s appeal was denied. 
Following the entry of the Decree and during the pendency of the first appeal. Mr. 
Betteridge learned that Ms. Betteridge was living with another man. He argued that he 
should not pay alimony based upon her cohabitation. Ms. Betteridge brought a motion for 
judgment for the arrears and for contempt. Mr. Betteridge argued he was not in contempt 
as he should not pay alimony based upon Ms. Betteridge cohabitation and the order of 
alimony should be retroactively modified to terminate alimony to the date of cohabitation. 
After an evidentiary hearing held on February 19 and 28. 2004, Judge Bohling ruled that 
Ms. Betteridge was not cohabiting, that a judgment for alimony arrears should enter, that 
Mr. Betteridge was in contempt of the Decree, and that Mr. Betteridge pay Ms. 
Betteridge's costs and attorney fees. Mr. Betteridge appeals from that order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. FIRST ISSUE: There was ample evidence that Ms. Betteridge was cohabiting 
within the statutory language and Utah case law for the termination of alimony. The 
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Court abused its discretion in failing to terminate the award of alimony retroactive to the 
date of cohabitation. 
2. SECOND ISSUE: Mr. Betteridge was not in contempt of the court order for 
the payment of alimony as he was under no obligation to pay alimony based upon Ms. 
Betteridge's cohabitation. 
3. THIRD ISSUE: No judgment for alimony should have entered as alimony 
should have been terminated based upon Ms. Betteridge's cohabitation. 
4. FOURTH ISSUE: MS. Betteridge should not have been awarded costs and 
attorney fees based upon her cohabitation. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO TERMINATE 
THE ALIMONY AWARD TO MS. BETTERIDGE BASED UPON HER 
COHABITATION. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(9) (1998 & Supp. 2002) does not provide a standard of 
proof for cohabitation. The standard of proof generally applied in civil proceedings is the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. See Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336. 1338 (Utah 
1986) ("It is universally recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by a 
preponderance of the evidence."); Lip/nan v. Industrial Comm'n. 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 
1979) (noting preponderance is "usual standard of proof. . . used in most civil actions"); 
Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 28 Utah 2d 206, 500 P.2d 505, 507 (1972) 
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(stating preponderance is "universally recognized standard of proof required to establish 
facts in a civil case"). Thus, cohabitation requires a preponderance of evidence standard. 
Utah law on cohabitation has evolved over time and has become less rigid in its 
application. Previous case law required sexual contact, residency, commingled finances 
and other factors. See Haddow v. Haddow\ 707 P.2d 669. 671-74 (Utah 1985) Sigg v. 
Sig& 905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Recently. Utah courts have required only access to the residence, having a key, 
eating together, and keeping clothes at the home. In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 
159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals found that even though 
the'eohabitanf' had a separated residence and the "cohabitants" did not share finances, 
there was indeed cohabitation and terminated the alimony award. Id. at 161. The Court 
found that the cohabitants spent four or five nights a week together when the man was in 
town, he came and went even though she was not there, ate together, and some of his 
personal property was kept at her home. Id. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, financial commingling is not dispositive to a finding of cohabitation. 
Another residence is not determinative to a finding of cohabitation. Sexual contact and a 
pattern of sharing time together are the determinative factors. 
It is also worth noting that in Pendleton, the ex-husband terminated his alimony 
payments prior to the finding of cohabitation. Id. at 160. 
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A. Ms. BETTERIDCE AND MR. REINEN SHARED A COMMON ABODE. 
Ms. Betteridge admits Mr. Reinen was spending nights at her apartment. 
Fact No. 1,2. Mr. Reinen admits staying there. Fact No. 2. Ms. Betteridge 
admits Mr. Reinen paid her rent. Fact N. 3. 8. She admits she needed financial 
assistance. Fact No. 2. Clearly, Mr. Reinen considered Ms. Bettereidge's 
apartment a residence or he would not have paid rent. Clearl}, Ms. Betteridge and 
Mr. Reinen shared a common abode by their own admissions. 
B. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL ALBEIT C IRC UMSTANTIAL EV IDENC E 
OF SEXUAL CONDUCT. 
Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen testified they had no sexual relationship. 
Fact No. 10. 1 Iowever, the evidence is ample that the parties did not treat each 
other as tenant/landlord or merely friends. 
Ms. Betteridge testified Mr. Reinen did not have a key to her apartment as 
she did not want him there when she was not at home. Fact No. 4. 
Mr. Reinen testified, on the other hand, that he spent time at the apartment 
when Ms. Betteridge was not there and that a key was left under the mat for him. 
Fact No. 5. 
Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen were affectionate in public. They kissed, 
hugged, he sat with his arm around her, they held hands. Fact No. 9, 21. They 
went out to dinner, movies and other activities. Fact No. 9. 
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Mr. Reinen kept toiletries and clothing at the apartment, even though Mr. 
Reinen had an apartment in the same complex. Fact Nos. 6, 7, 11. 
Mr. Reinen was introduced to Ms. Bcttcridge's family. Fact Nos. 12. 13. 
18. Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen exchanged personal, expensive gifts such as 
robes, jewelry and a leather coat. Fact Nos. 14, 15. Each received and gave gifts 
to the other's family members. Fact Nos. 16, 17. This in light ofthe fact that Ms. 
Betteridge needed rent for financial reasons, yet was purchasing gifts for Mr. 
Reinen and his family. These were important family occasions when Mr. 
Reinen was the only non-family member present. 
Ms. Betteridge denied displaying a photograph of Mr. Reinen, Fact No. 
19, her two sons, testified otherwise. Fact Nos. 20, 21. The only other 
photographs displayed were of family members, not friends. Fact No. 20. 
In light of Ms. Betteridge's sexual history during the marriage. Fact No. 
24. the evidence is sufficient to establish a sexual relationship existed. Particularly 
when there is a dispute between the alleged cohabitants as to the reason for the 
termination ofthe cohabitation. Fact Nos. 22, 23. Under Pendleton, Mr. Reinen 
had access, spent time at the apartment alone, and stayed with Ms. Betteridge. 
Mr. Reinen testified he left because ofthe litigation so there was no evidence it 
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was a temporary relationship. Mr. Reinen testified he left because of the litigation 
so there was no evidence it was a temporary relationship. 
The trial court abused its discretion by 1) finding no, common abode and 2) no 
sexual relationship. The trial court's decision should be overturned. 
IT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING MR. 
BETTERIDCE IN CONTEMPT OF THE DECREE. 
Respondent could find no Utah case law on point as to whether cohabitation 
is a defense to contempt. Respondent argues that using an analogy of mine pro tune and 
void ab initio cases would be an appropriate and equitable method of analyzing this 
matter. Utah law, in equity, condones "fictions" thus placing equity before technicality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) (1998 & Supp.2003) and case law allows for 
termination of alimony upon the establishment of cohabitation and it the alimony 
terminates when the cohabitation commenced. Thus, the Court can order that an alimony 
award is void to the instigation of the cohabitation. It is as though the order of alimony 
did not exist. 
Cases involving nunc pro tune orders make orders that are not retroactive back to a 
previous date but have the effect of entering an order "now for then*\ State v. Cordon. 
913 P.2d 350, 532 n.l (Utah 1996). The Gordon Court stated: "Nunc pro tunc 'applie[s| 
to acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done . . . with the same 
effect as if regularly done/ Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 964 (5lh ed. 1979)). See 
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also State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 n.l (Utah 1981); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 
(Utah 1994); Bags haw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Similarly, a finding of cohabitation terminates alimony "now for then". Thus, it is 
as though the order never existed. By analogy, if the order is treated as though it did not 
exist, non-payment of the alimony award is condoned. 
Further, Utah statute allows for subsequent events to be effectively ignored. The 
alimony statute provides that annulment finding the marriage to be void ah initio will 
reinstate the alimony order from the previous marriage. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(9) 
(1998 & Supp. 2003). It is as though the subsequent marriage never existed and the 
previous decree is reinstated. 
It would not be inappropriate for the Court to look to statutes that allow for 
equitable principles to supercede technical requirements. In equity. Respondent should 
not have been sanctioned for contempt when he should not have been paying alimony in 
the first place due to Petitioner's actions. Petitioner had unclean hands if she is or was 
cohabiting and did not inform Respondent so that alimony could terminate. 
The Court's finding of contempt flowed from its finding that Ms. Betteridge was 
not cohabiting. If the finding of cohabitation is overturned because of the trial court's 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Betteridge's contempt must fall as well. There should have been 
on order of alimony due to the cohabitation and, therefore, no contempt of the order. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A JUDGMENT 
AGAINST MR. BETTERIDGE FOR ALIMONY ARREARS. 
Alimony should have been terminated based upon Ms. Betteridge\s cohabitation. 
Thus, it follows that no judgment should have been entered against Mr. Betteridge for the 
alimony arrears. Bagshawv. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Stale v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 532 n.l (Utah 1996); Stale v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 
n.l (Utah 1981); Whyle v. Bkw\ 885 P.2d 791. 793 (Utah 1994). 
[V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING M S . 
BETTERIDGE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
Ms. Betteridge should not have prevailed on the issue of cohabitation and her 
award of costs and fees was based upon her status as the prevailing party. The court 
based the award of costs and fees upon her prevailing on the issue, fact No. 270. fhus, 
if the Court overturns the finding regarding no cohabitation, the award of costs and fees 
fails as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Betteridge was cohabiting with another man and therefore her alimony should 
be terminated retroactive to the date of cohabitation. No contempt by Mr. Betteridge can 
be sustained and no judgment for alimony arrears, costs ol lees should have entered. 
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O^ 
DATED this J day of June, 2004. 
SC^LLE,V & REApiNp, P.C. 
Lli 
(I (/ I/A •\J V< 
A Lisa A. Reading 
'Ty Attorney for Rcspondent/Appeilant 
^ 7 \ 
'>< / 
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Third Judicial District 
Glen M. Richman (USB #2752) 
Barbara W. Richman (USB #1707) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDRA D. BETTERIDGE, 
Petitioner, 
;i VS. 
BRENT R. BETTERIDGE, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 014901312 DA 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Judge William B. Bohling 
i _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 
The evidentiary hearing on Respondent's contempt which was certified to the Court by the 
Domestic Commissioner took place on February 19, 2003 and February 28, 2003. Petitioner was 
present in person and represented by her counsel of record, Glen M. Richman and Barbara W. Richman, 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. Respondent was present in person and represented by his counsel of 
record, Lisa A. Jones, SCALLEY & READING. The Court heard the testimony of witnesses and the 
parties, received evidence, and heard the arguments of counsel. Having made its findings of fact in open 
court on the record, the Court hereby makes and enters the following 
014901312 BETTERIDGE, BRE J D 
JUN 1 6 2003 
SALT LA^2oUNTY 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY ~ ' *wv« 
ORDER 
1. The recommendation of the Commissioner for entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner and 
against Respondent in the sum of fr i^&^A* which represents accrued and unpaid alimony for the period 
November 1, 2002 through January 31, 2003 is approved and Petitioner is hereby awarded judgment 
against Respondent in the sum of 54,800.00 plus interest accruing thereafter at the judgment rate until 
paid in full. 
2. Based upon the findings made by the Court on the record, Respondent has failed to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the alimony awarded to Petitioner terminated as a matter of law 
as allowed pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(9). The Court therefore concludes and finds Respondent in 
contempt of the order of the Court entered on December 23, 2002 which required payment by him of the 
sum of $1,600.00 per month as and for alimony to Petitioner. 
3. Petitioner is hereby awarded her reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs expended 
in collection efforts of the judgment awarded in the Decree of Divorce entered December 23, 2002, 
along with her reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs expended in bringing her Verified 
Motion for Order to Show Cause and defending against Respondent's claims of cohabitation. 
Betteridge v. Betteridge 
Case No! 014901312 ^  
X:\Richman\Betteridge, Andra\p-order judgment 030226.doc 
Sit 
4. Respondent is hereby ordered to appear before the court on March 31, 2003 at 9:15 a.m. and 
present a reasonable plan for payment of all amounts ordered by the court in the Decree of Divorce 
entered December 23, 2002 and by this Order and Judgment. 
DATED this v O day of _ VJJJO<JL . 2003. 
BY TP\E COURT 
WILLIAM B. BOHLLNG 
Judge, Third District Court 
APPROVED AS TO SUBSTANCE AND FORM: 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
LISA A. JONES 
Attorney for Respondent 
Betteridge v. Betteridge 
Case No. 014901312 
X:\Richman\Betteridge, Andra\p-ovder judgment 030226.doc 
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Lisa A. Jones [#5496] 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDRA D. BETTER1DGE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRENT R. BETTERIDGE, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON 
COHABITATION AND CONTEMPT 
Civil No. 014901312 DA 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
COMES NOW, Respondent, by and through counsel, Lisa A. Jones, and respectfully submits 
the following case law and argument on the issues of contempt and cohabitation. 
HISTORY 
1. Trial was held on September 27, 2002. The Court awarded Petitioner $1,600 per 
month in alimony and ordered that the award of alimony should be retroactive so as to begin with the 
month of February, 2002. Judgment entered in the amount of $14,400 for nine (9) months, February, 
2002 through October, 2002. 
Ha 
2. Respondent did not pay the on-going alimony or the judgment (except for garnishments 
on his wages and bank accounts). 
3. Petitioner sought and was granted certification of contempt for non-compliance with the 
Decree and another judgment in the amount of $4800 was entered. 
4. An evidentiary hearing was granted to address the issues of contempt and the defense 
of cohabitation for non-payment. 
5. The parties stipulated and the Court found that a prima facie showing of 
contempt was met by the Petitioner. The Court found that the elements of a written order, 
Respondent's knowledge of the order, Respondent's ability to pay (based upon the findings in the 
Decree) and Respondent's non-payment of the on-going alimony and judgment amounts were met. 
CONTEMPT 
The issue of whether Petitioner's alleged cohabitation is a defense to non-compliance with a 
court order is discussed below. 
Respondent could find no Utah case law on point as to whether cohabitation is a defense to 
contempt. Respondent argues that using an analogy of nunc pro tunc and void ab initio cases would 
be an appropriate and equitable method of analyzing this matter. Utah law, in equity, condones 
"fictions" thus placing equity before technicality. 
Brief 
Pace 2 
m 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(9) (1998 & Supp.2002) and case law allows for termination of 
alimony upon the establishment of cohabitation and it the alimony terminates when the cohabitation 
commenced. Thus, the Court can order that an alimony award is void to the instigation of the 
cohabitation. It is as though the order of alimony did not exist. 
Cases involving nunc pro tunc orders make orders that are not retroactive back to a previous 
date but have the effect of entering an order "now for then". State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 532 n.l 
(Utah 1996). The Gordon Court stated: "Nunc pro tunc 'applie[s] to acts allowed to be done after the 
ti me when they should be done . . . with the same effect as if regularly done.' Id. (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 964 (5th ed. 1979)). See also State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 n.l (Utah 1981); Whyte 
v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Similarly, a finding of cohabitation terminates alimony "now for then". Thus, it is as though the 
order never existed. By analogy, if the order is treated as though it did not exist, non-payment of the 
alimony award is condoned. 
Further, Utah statute allows for subsequent events to be effectively ignored. The alimony 
statute provides that annulment finding the marriage to be void ab initio will reinstate the alimony order 
from the previous marriage. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8) (1998 & Supp. 2002). It is as though the 
subsequent marriage never existed and the previous decree is reinstated. 
Brief 
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It would not be mappiopnate for the Court to look to statutes that allow for equitable principles 
to supercede technical requirements In equity Respondent should not be sanctioned for contempt 
when he should not have been paying alimony in the first place due to Petitioner s actions Petitionei 
has unclean hands if she is or was cohabiting and did not inform Respondent so that alimony could 
terminate 
COHABITATION 
Utah Code Ann §30 3 5(9) (1998 & Supp 2002) does not provide a standard of proof for 
cohabitation The standard of pi oof generally applied m civil pioceedmgs is the preponderance of the 
evidence standaid See Johns v Shulsen, 717 P 2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) (' It is umveisally 
recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by a pieponderance of the evidence "), Lipman 
v IndustJial Comm'n, 592 P 2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979) (noting preponderance is usual standard of 
proof used in most civil actions"), Moms v Faimei s Home Mut Ins Co , 28 Utah 2d 206, 500 
P 2d 505 507 (1972) (stating preponderance is ' universally recognized standard of proof requned to 
establish facts in a civil case') Thus, cohabitation requires a pieponderance of evidence standaid 
Utah law on cohabitation has evolved over time and has become less rigid in its application 
Previous case law required sexual contact, residency, commingled finances and other factors See 
Haddow A Haddou, 707 P 2d 669, 671 74 (Utah 1985) Sigg \ Sigg, 905 P 2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct 
App 1995) 
Brief 
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Recently, Utah courts have required only access to the residence, having a key, eating together, 
and keeping clothes at the home. In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
the Utah Court of Appeals found that even though the"cohabitant" had a separated residence and the 
"cohabitants" did not share finances, there was indeed cohabitation and terminated the alimony award. 
Id. at 161. The Court found that the cohabitants spent four or five nights a week together when the man 
was in town, he came and went even though she was not there, ate together, and some of his personal 
property was kept at her home. Id. 
Thus, financial commingling is not dispositive to a finding of cohabitation. Another residence is 
not determinative to a finding of cohabitation. Sexual contact and a pattern of sharing time together are 
the determinative factors. 
It is also worth noting that in Pendleton, the ex-husband terminated his alimony payments prior 
to the finding of cohabitation. Id. at 160. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent seeks a finding of cohabitation and an equitable finding that the 
defense of cohabitation abrogates any contempt. 
DATED t h i s 2 7 _ day of February, 2003. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Lisa A. Jones v/ 
Attorney for Respondent 
Brief 
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